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This paper highlights how multi-scalar interstitial policy failings of the EU fisheries
policy can directly trigger policy gaps in fisheries management at the expense of
artisanal communities, leading to further expansion opportunities for industrial fishing
and triggering instability and marginalization of traditional fishing communities. In order
to contextualize and demonstrate this complexity, we explore a detailed scenario of the
Maltese waters to show how the development of a national policy portfolio post-EU
accession has destabilized long-existing functional fishing governance mechanisms
and now pose a direct challenge to the sustainable management of the marine
socio-ecological system. Using a mixed-method approach to investigate the partially
obscured social, economic and political dynamics which drive marine policy, we
demonstrate how the coastal fisheries have become subject to multiple-use competition
arising primarily from a burgeoning recreational fishing sector that has benefited from
“access-enabling policies,” and is, to a great extent uninhibited by fish conservation
regulations. Our findings demonstrate how a deeper understanding of the socio-
political ramifications of policy processes is necessary to improve the governance and
management of contested and congested open-access fisheries.
Keywords: fisheries governance, small-scale fisheries, overfishing, policy-process, neoliberalism, recreational
fisheries, policy gaps
INTRODUCTION
The global crisis of diminishing fish stocks is pervasive (Coulthard et al., 2011) with international
efforts to resolve this human-induced catastrophe stubbornly ineffective (Bodin and Österblom,
2013). This is especially the case in the Mediterranean Sea (Vasilakopoulos et al., 2014; Cardinale
and Scarcella, 2017), that hosts a fishing fleet of around 91,540 fishing vessels (FAO, 2016) from
more than 20 countries making it one of the most intensely fished seas worldwide (Fernandes et al.,
2017; Panagopoulou et al., 2017) with more than 85% of the assessed stocks overexploited (Colloca
et al., 2013). The Mediterranean Regulation of the European Common Fisheries Policy is the main
framework for fish conservation within this region (EC, 1967/2006). A number of studies have
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shown that risks to fish stocks has not receded, mainly due to,
policy-induced problems which are fuelling the overexploitation
of the fisheries (Colloca et al., 2013; Fernandes et al., 2017).
These include lack of realistic national management plans which
conform to the maximum sustainable yields as defined by the
scientific advice (Cardinale and Scarcella, 2017), and the failure
to control “technological creep” and the associated enlarged
capacity to harvest fish from this sector (Damalas, 2017).
The decline in fish stocks has socio-economic impacts on the
fishing fleets, and such impacts are heavily felt across the small-
scale sector, which comprises 80% of theMediterranean fleet, and
which is relatively less studied than the large-scale and industrial
segment (Battaglia et al., 2010; Lloret et al., in press). Small-scale
fishing in the Mediterranean, which primarily includes vessels
that are smaller than 12m in length has been noticed to be in
a general decline in the past decades (Gómez et al., 2006; Arceo
et al., 2013; Fabio et al., 2016; Said, 2017; Lloret et al., in press)
due to an aging demographic of fishermen (Tzanatos et al.,
2005), declining resources, and incremental competition from
the industrial sector (Gómez et al., 2006; Panagopoulou et al.,
2017) and the recreational fleet (European Parliament, 2006;
Hadjimichael et al., 2013; Lloret and Font, 2013; Giovos et al.,
2018). What is less understood, however, is how or whether this
small-scale sector degeneration is being managed or addressed
by the governance and policy systems in place, especially now
that the EU has recently pledged to support the sustainable
development of Mediterranean small-scale fisheries through the
Medfish4Ever roadmap (European Commission, 2017).
Although the Mediterranean regulation sets a number of
generic fisheries governance principles for small-scale fisheries,
this segment does not get the same level of management
requirements as the large-scale counterpart, and management
remains mostly the responsibility of the national governments.
In other words, the Mediterranean regulation defines specific
obligations for the Member States (MS) to ratify into their
national policy portfolio, and simultaneously endows MS with
jurisdiction to attend to their needs when it comes to small-scale
fisheries. This flexibility, which is aligned to the EU principle
of subsidiarity whereby decision-making is decentralized to the
“most appropriate level of competence” (Benson and Jordan,
2014) endows the individual MS with the freedom to implement
management according to their needs. Although principle is
sound, giving the MS more control to cater for local needs in its
management framework; in reality it can lead to a policy “blind
spot” where insufficient attention is paid to the aggregate impact
since their management is not an EU obligation. Thus, the degree
to which the EU principle of subsidiarity equates to or facilitates
adaptive management is debatable (Payne, 2000) as policy gaps
can create governability challenges that can engulf traditional
fisheries systems (Jentoft, 2007).
To investigate the role of subsidiarity in the context of small-
scale fisheries governance in the Mediterranean, we take Malta
as a case study. Our approach draws on the concept of “policy
process frameworks” that shape the decision-making of marine
resource-use to yield important insights into the transformations
occurring in socio-ecological systems and their implications
on the fisheries governance (Van Tatenhove, 2011; Orach and
Schlüter, 2016). Our research has broader significance to the
study on the sustainability implications of global responsible
fisheries management (Coll et al., 2013) and contributes to the
international literature that shows how policy gaps emanating
from cross-scale misfits trigger governance challenges to marine
resource management (Treml et al., 2015).
Small-Scale Fisheries in Malta
Malta is a small southern European island which became a
European Union MS in 2004 and currently has a small-scale
fishing fleet of 935 small-scale vessels, representing over 93%
of the fleet at the national level (Said, 2017). Between 2000
and 2010, the small-scale fishing fleet in Malta faced a decline
of 30% in the number of vessels, ranking among the top EU
countries experiencing such degeneration (Lloret et al., in press),
thus making it a suitable candidate as a Mediterranean case
study. Malta provides an interesting case since a specific chapter
in the EU Mediterranean regulation has been dedicated to its
complexity, yet ample flexibility is left into the hands of national
government (MS jurisdiction) to determine the management of
the coastal fishing resources contested by industrial, small-scale
and recreational fisheries, as indicated in Table 1. Essentially,
whereas specific management plans are in place for large-
scale trawling and purse-seining in line with the Mediterranean
Regulation (see MSDEC, 2013b), there are no management plans
that encompass fisheries targeted by the small-scale artisanal
fishing sector including trammel nets pots-and-traps, and long-
lines, as these are not an EU obligation. Nevertheless, the small-
scale fishing sector, as a commercial segment of the fleet, is subject
to fishing capacity clauses which has been in place to sustainably
conserve the fish stocks within Malta’s 25 nautical mile fisheries
management zone (FMZ) as per Mediterranean Regulation.
Although these clauses limit the commercial fishing capacity;
i.e., the total number of industrial and small-scale fishing vessels
that can fish in the zone [EC 1967/2016 26 (1) (b)], it does not cap
the capacity of the recreational fleet that may operate within the
zone. Hence, the recreational sector in Malta, which according
to the Maltese fisheries law is legally permitted “to work on a
low scale” (Cap 425.07 Art 9) remains an open-access and largely
unmanaged segment that has, in the past decade, registered a
substantial increase in the number of vessels and fish catches
(Khalfallah et al., 2017).
The growth in the recreational sector is therefore a potential
threat to fish stocks and to remaining commercial artisanal fleet.
In this article, we sought to understand the socio-political drivers
that determine the governance of the multiple use open-access
fisheries to understand the impacts on the traditional socio-
ecological system. In particular, we seek to understand the socio-
political justification behind allowing an expanding recreational
fleet to grow in the lieu of a holistic management framework
for the inshore fisheries and the consequential implications
that these arrangements are having on the sustainability of
the coastal fisheries, which are the bedrock of the small-
scale fishing communities. By scrutinizing the policy-process
framework involved, we provide important lessons on how
national jurisdictional flexibility can tap on supranational policy
interstices to engender a new fisheries governance framework
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No restrictions, MS jurisdiction Limited in line with Article 26 (1)
(b)
Large vessels allowed to
increase post-EU (Article 26)
Fishing zones No restrictions, MS jurisdiction No restrictions, MS jurisdiction Specific zones within
territorial seas
Gear use Prohibited nets, dredges and
harpoons with scuba
Restrictions on mesh size of set
gillnets (Art 9 (6))
Restrictions on mesh size,
depths and days at sea (Art
9 (6))
Catch sales Prohibited commercialization Allowed
Management plans No management plans in place, MS
jurisdiction
Not for artisanal demersal
fisheries, MS jurisdiction
Management plans for
trawls and purse seines
EC 199/2008 EU Data Collection
Framework





EC 1224/2009 EU Control
Regulation
Logbook Only for pelagic species larger than
50 kg







Fishing gear As defined in EC 1967/2006 Spatial and temporal restrictions
(Since 1935)




Definition “Work on a low scale”
(Since 2004)
a person who is engaged—in fishing for sale—and—relies on
his fishing activities for the whole or part of his income
Catch sales Not defined Minimum Value of Landings
(Schedule III)
that while compliant with EU law, is not attuned to the new local
fishing realities unfolding at sea.
METHODOLOGY
As there is no coherent and comprehensive official data to
guide and inform our exploration, we adopted a “blended
inductive approach,” collecting data coordinated through
various integrated approaches and methods that assimilate
and triangulate information to gain greatest possible insight
and understanding of what are complex, sensitive and partially
obscured issues. A number of formal (n = 47) and informal
(n = 123) interviews were conducted with recreational and
professional fishermen both at sea, and in their workshops’
premises between June 2014 and August 2015. Co-incidental
meetings also took place in bars and at the fishing ports.
Participant observation during fishing trips was also integral
to the research effort as it provided an opportunity to delve
into the realities of policy-related matters. The main author’s
previous acquaintance with the field was important to establish
the necessary trust and gain access to key informants in the
fishing communities. Speaking the same language and dialect as
the fishers, placed the researcher at an easier stance approaching
individuals and gaining the tacit understanding of particular oral
statements and attitudes that are inaccessible to “professional
outsiders” (Agar, 1996).
A more formal series of interviews were held with the official
representatives of the fishers’ co-operatives, the Federation for
Recreational Fishermen Associations (FRFA) as well as the
website administrators of the Malta Fish Forum (MFF). TheMFF
is an online interface1 that hosts threads of discussions between
different fishers—predominantly recreational—and provides
important public information on complex issues pertaining to
the recreational sector, which otherwise would be very difficult
to gather through other methods. Further information was
gained from secondary data sources including media articles and
websites, government public information, and other academic
work that focused on the subject matter. The triangulation of
information from multiple sources is important to reduce bias
especially on contentious and sensitive issues such as the case of
rights to resource-use (MacMillan and Han, 2011). The analysis
of the data was based on the constructivist grounded theory
approach (Charmaz, 2006) with the aim of reaching a saturation
of predominant concepts through a process of theoretical coding
and successively forming a narrative grounded in quantitative
data and direct qualitative excerpts.
RESULTS
Rationalization of the Fleet and the
Emergence of the Recreational Sector
Upon EU accession, the national government initiated the
process of transposing the obligations of the EU Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) to Malta. One of the core obligations was
to align the fishing fleet to “achieve a stable and enduring balance
of fishing capacity with fishing opportunities” (EC 2371/2002
1See http://www.maltafishingforum.com/
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Art.11). The Maltese government ratified this obligation and
capped the fishing fleet by not issuing new commercial licenses
unless they replaced older licenses with the same kilowatt and
tonnage (EC 2371/2002 Art.13). An ongoing process of fleet
restructuration was also encouraged by the Government from
2005 to promote the replacement of what were considered as
“inactive” and “low-income-nature” vessels with “economically
efficient” vessels in an endeavor to rationalize the fleet and
making it more competitive within the EU single market. In
the small-scale fishers’ perspective however, this “rationalization”
process also meant making space for large-scale vessels and
distributing “trawling and permits to a handful of powerful
and politically-connected individuals” (Artisanal fisher). In fact
between 2005 and 2013, the number of registered trawlers in the
commercial segment increased by 69% (NSO, 2004, 2015).
A legitimate way to initiate this process was sought through
the establishment of a minimum landing scheme [Schedule III
(Cap 425.07)] which obliged fishers to catch and declare specific
amounts of fish sales to be able to retain their commercial
license. Vessels that have been unable to fulfill the minimum
specified declarations have been transferred either into the
part-time commercial segment (MFB), or to a new category
specifically established for “Non-Commercial Fishing Vessels i.e.,
recreational” known as the MFC category (Cap 425.07 Art 8 [b].
With the advent of this declaration system, some fishers also
decided voluntarily to leave the commercial sector and join the
MFC for they were “informally informed” by officials that “they
could retain the same fishing practices without having to declare
any catches” (ex-artisanal fisher). Back then, this was particularly
enticing for those who did not want to declare catches due to
taxation purposes. As a result of these processes, in the initial
phase (2005) there was a sudden drop in the number of full-
time (MFA) and part-time vessels (MFB), accompanied by the
appearance of 826 recreational vessels within the MFC category
(Figure 1). This rationalization process is ongoing, and over the
years, around 1,000 small-scale vessels have transferred from the
commercial to the recreational segment. Being of an open-access
nature, the recreational register also accommodates the entrance
of new individuals and in 2015, the segment had risen up to 1935
recreationally-registered vessels.
In contrast to the recreational segment, and as a result
of the rationalization process, the number of commercial
small-scale vessels has been constantly declining (Figure 1),
with GT and KW becoming increasingly channeled to the
enlargement of commercial large-scale vessels, predominantly
linked to the corporate growth of fishing companies that have
started appearing post-EU accession. As a result, commercial
vessels are becoming scarce and expensive, and new small-scale
entrants face a significant economic barrier to entry due to the
high commercial value placed on existing boat licenses. The
expansion of the MFC is also partly related to this market-driven
system because those people who cannot afford to purchase a
commercial license or a commercially-licensed vessel on the open
market, can possibly gain a commercial fishing permit from the
government when, or if, fleet capacity becomes available.
Through this process, when capacity is available, the
government distributes permits to those who apply for one,
including MFC license holders. This opportunity entices
potential entrants to register their vessels initially as MFC, and
await their turn to attain the commercial license from the
government. In other words, the MFC register has become, to
a certain extent, a de facto gateway to the commercial small-
scale sector. Having said this, it was clear for those interviewed
that the license-allocation process itself is not transparent and is
enmeshed in patterns of nepotism that only those with patronage
links to top officials can access. Indeed, there is a perceptible
increase in anticipation about permit acquisition close to general
national elections with many individuals often “promised” a
commercial permit in return for their vote by political candidates:
“Last election. . . few weeks before the election, I was told that I will
get a permit, but I never got it.” (MFC owner).
This is why in the past decade, the Maltese recreational
sector kept growing, and has become larger than the small-
scale counterpart. Hence we can ascertain that despite being
referred to as a “recreational” sector, the MFC category was
actually set up to “push out” a total of over 1,000 artisanal vessels
from the “commercial” register into a “non-commercial one,”
and to accommodate potential entrants to becoming commercial
fishers incognito, and not actually to develop leisure-pursuit
fishing. The key policy regulation driving this transformation was
allowing members of the MFC fleet to retain most of their fishing
rights using artisanal fishing gear which is not controlled by the
Mediterranean regulation (Article 8 & 17) and hence being able,
albeit indirectly, to purse fishing for a commercial reason “on a
low scale” (Cap 425.07 Art 9).
Although not officially allowed to sell their catch (EC,
1967/2006) (Art. 17), this “loophole” has attracted both artisanal
fishermen, who could sell their commercial license to newcomers,
predominantly large-scale investors, and also entirely new
fishermen to join the recreational segment. This is because there
are no specific restrictions on a wide range of species and
gears such as bottom long-lines, pots and traps, trolling lines,
and other pole-and-line tackle that are also widely used by the
commercial small-scale sector. In addition to the MFC segment,
there exists a Small Ships Register (SSR) (Cap 499.52) which falls
under Transport Malta (TM) and currently hosts 13,905 pleasure
crafts2. Although there is no definite figure of how many of these
vessels actually engage in recreational fishing, these vessels can
lawfully use different types of fishing gear and thus have the same
impact on fish stocks and on the small-scale fishing sector as the
MFC fleet.
It is thus understandable why the MFC fleet, which
has predominantly been the result of a neoliberal fleet
restructuration, is more than a mere “leisure-based” sector. It
hosts a range of fishers who perceive the “recreational” license in
various ways, including those (i) who are ex-professional fishers
sustaining their livelihoods (or part of it) through the MFC
license, (ii) who have joined in with a “wish to fish” expecting or
hoping that someday they will become recognized as commercial
fishers and benefit from European Union funding and national
fuel subsidies allocated to this commercial segment; others that
(iii) fish for leisure but veer toward catch commercialization
2This information was supplied by Transport Malta on 16th August 2016.
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The Fishing Fleet Register 2004-2015
Professional/Commercial Recreat_ional (MFC)
EU Policies: EU Mediterranean Regulation, Data Collection Framework, Control Regulation 
National: Fleet Restructuration and creation of recreational register to cater for 54% commercial overspill and 46% newcomers 
FIGURE 1 | This chart, which is based on data supplied by the National Statistics Office and the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, illustrates the way by
which the national fishing fleet register has evolved in tandem with policy shifts in the past decade since EU accession. It demonstrates how the commercial segments
have decreased drastically through the restructuration phase in 2005 which saw the establishment of a recreational sector that has initially acted as an overspill
register of the commercial fleet, and has since then grown to become the biggest fleet segment.
to offset costs; and (iv) who pursuit purely leisure fisheries,
including catch and release.
All these distinctive motivations have been developing under
the umbrella of “recreational” fishing, but are generating a
series of socio-ecological consequences to the marine commons
and the artisanal small-scale commercial fleet dependent on
these resources. Specifically, the growth of the recreational
sector, which is a result of policy-enabling mechanisms, remains
unmanaged, and has triggered an interconnected reaction within
the socio-ecological system that is manifesting primarily as
problems of overfishing, resource-use conflicts, and reduced
catches.
Policies Fuelling the Battle for the Coastal
Commons
Competition for fisheries resources within Malta’s FMZ is
increasingly contested among industrial trawlers, artisanal-
commercial vessels and the recreational fleet directly due
to enabling policy measures taken since EU accession. The
industrial trawling fleet, which was previously restricted as a
measure to protect the small-scale sector (Camilleri, 2002),
for example, has been allowed to increase its coastal fisheries
catch by 148% within designated trawling zones of the
FMZ3 (MSDEC, 2013a) extending into the 3 nautical zone.
3These zones, which are based on a study conducted in 1978 (see Giudicelli, 1978),
were mainly implemented in a period when trawling was done by small trawlers.
Following the studies in 1970s, various developments took place including the
restriction of the trawling operations from the 3 nautical mile zone following
representation made by fishermen using inshore artisanal traditional gear [14, p.
Here they now compete with small-scale fishing activity and
simultaneously, the growth of the burgeoning recreational sector
is leading to direct competition on an unprecedented scale
with the artisanal sector—as one artisanal fisher explained
“The sea cannot hold everyone. There isn’t enough fish for
everyone!.”
In some cases, artisanal professional fishers cannot compete
for fish with the recreational fishermen as the latter often have
more powerful boats which allows them to reach the fishing
grounds more quickly to find the best spots, and to fish for
longer. Artisanal fishermen, who are unable to increase their
vessel engine size due to the commercial engine capacity limits
imposed by the EU law, feel hard done by. As one artisanal
fishermen said “. . . when we arrive we find recreational fishermen
in the exact same spot, so we have to go look for another good
fishing ground, and waste precious fishing time in the process.”
A closer look at the situation in terms of engine power
distribution across the MFC vessels illustrates that the
number of recreational vessels outcompete the commercial
counterpart within the “0.1–49 KW” and “50–99 KW” engine
power categories (Table 2). This means that the artisanal-
professional fishers are the ones enduring the highest level
of competition by the recreational sector, especially when the
latter targets fisheries that bring good prices within the local
markets.
55], and the discovery of new “lucrative” areas by the trawling operators, which
were not reflected within the Mediterranean regulation [15].
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TABLE 2 | The recreational vessels (MFC)4 outnumber the amount of
artisanal-professional vessels in the smaller-engine cohorts, thereby
demonstrating the intense and one-sided competition posed by the recreational
sector on the artisanal counterpart (Data provided by national government).
Engine size (KW) Number of vessels
Artisanal-professional Recreational
0.1–49 KW 549 1441
50–99 KW 218 348
Although the sale of recreational catches is prohibited by
the EU Regulation 1967/2006 (Art 17[3]), illicit sales of fish
have been observed to take place via various informal means5
by various parties including divers, ex-professional fishermen
and new recreational fishers who own SSR and MFC registered
vessels. Species include Red snapper (pagrus pagrus), grouper
(Epinephelus guazza), Dentex (Dentex dentex), scorpion fish
(Scorpaena scorfa), John Dory (Zeus faber), and amberjack
(Seriola Dumerili), fish that are predominately sold in local fish
markets as well as served as the “local fisherman’s catch” in typical
Maltese restaurants. Small-scale fishers are angry as this illicit
practice negatively affects their income. In the low tourist season
when demand usually subsides, they cannot sell all of their own
catch due to the availability of “black fish” and in even in the
high season, illicit sales depress prices as many restaurants and
fish shops source their fish from recreational fishers. According
to one fisher, “When I try to sell fish to restaurants the owner tells
me that he already bought the same type of fish ate1−e2/ per kilo
less from an amateur – and so the owner reduces the price of your
fish. . . I know for a fact that these businesses have direct contacts
with the recreational fishers because they can get a better deal with
these people.”
There is little or no enforcement in place and the discrete sale
of black fish is somehow permitted by the authorities despite
the financial hardship imposed on their artisanal counterparts,
who are already having difficulties sustaining their livelihood due
to the privatization of the Bluefin tuna fishery and far reaching
restrictions on the swordfish season (Said et al., 2016). Against
a back drop of diminishing stock levels of all commercially-
important fish, these contestations have developed into a blame-
game within which fishers accuse one another for the dire state
of the fisheries. For example, one artisanal fisherman argued that
“the sea is destroyed by those that don’t need to live from it; not
the fishermen who must live from it. But no one understands
this – they (policy-makers and scientists) consider professional
4The engine power details of the small-ship register (SSR) vessels were not available
hence they were omitted from this table. In hindsight, however, given the large
number of registered SSR vessels (13,905), the pattern of recreational domination
within the engine power cohorts is realistically higher than depicted in this table,
and thus the processes of conflict are inevitably striking.
5Online public posts on the MFF also highlighted this activity, for example in a
particular thread an individual stated that “recreational fishers must all appreciate
that given the rampant practice of selling one’s catch” . . . “we (recreational fishers)
are not viewed in a very good light. . . During the Alungi (Albacore) season people
are trying to oﬄoad their catch to cover expenses, same goes for deep bottom fishing,
jigging, spearfishing etc.” (Posted on 22nd November, 2012).
fishermen as destroyers, and recreational fishermen as sustainable
because they target fewer species, they say,” while another fisher
has blamed the “divers with aqualungs and harpoons since they
have destroyed lots of good quality fish”. A recreational fisherman,
on the other hand, has argued that “the problem is certainly not
the recreational fishermen. . . they [the authorities] better look at
the damage that trawling is doing on the reefs” (MFF website),
while another debated that “. . . if they really want conservation
of fish they better start with laws for those who use trammel nets
and trawling. . . ” (MFF website). Another striking post on the
same online thread exclaimed “After all, WE [the recreational
fishermen] ARE NOT THE CULPRITS THAT ARE FINISHING
OFF THE SEA!!!!!!!!!” (MFF website).
In this blame-game, the local discourses converge on a similar
standpoint that conveys a perturbing “overfishing” situation
which needs to be somehow resolved if commercial fish catches
are to be sustainable. However, the issue of catch management
of the coastal fisheries within the FMZ does not seem to be
receiving specific attention within the national management
portfolio as the supranational EU policy pertaining to coastal
fisheries provides only for the management of the large-scale
fishing sectors operating within the FMZ. In this regard, the
information gap between what is officially recorded andmanaged
in terms of resources, and what is actually unfolding at sea in
terms of fishing effort, remains a threat to marine governance of
inshore waters.
Policy Gaps Are Catalyzing the Demise of
Small-Scale Fisheries
It is clear that the supranational policies, which have in part
stimulated greater competition in Maltese waters, have not also
enabled or required the introduction of a more holistic approach
to the management of multiple-use fisheries in inshore waters.
Specifically, in terms of the sustainable exploitation of fisheries, as
per provisions within theMediterranean Regulation, theMember
States are only required to implement management plans for
large-scale and industrial activities including trawling and purse-
seining, and not for other artisanal passive gears targeting
commercial species—i.e., trammel and gill nets, bottom-long
lines, pots and traps, and pole-lines. In other words, these gears,
most of which can be lawfully used by the recreational sector, are
not legally required to be managed for sustainability purposes.
Moreover, although legal provisions within the same Regulation
are in place to regulate recreational fishing, they are not attuned
to mitigate competition with their commercial counterpart, so
national authorities, in principle, are not legally obliged to control
the exploitation of open-access fisheries contested by multiple
users.
In fact, in Malta, we find that the regulatory framework for
sustainable management of fishing effort and/or state of the
fish stocks is weak and unenforced. It seems that the national
authorities are permitting an open-access regime and giving
no specific attention to the fishing capacity thresholds that
the coastal fisheries can withstand. Both the small-scale coastal
fishing activities and the recreational fishing effort, which in
itself was a product of policy-enabling mechanisms, remain
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unmanaged and obscured. There is no data that indicates what
is caught and how by the recreational sector, as the government
has since 2005, applied for an EU derogation that exempts it
from collecting data on the recreational catches. This derogation
was justified by national report-findings which suggested that
“the total catches from recreational fisheries constitute a very
low percentage of the total catches” (Department of Fisheries
Aquaculture, 2006), and that recreational fisheries have low
impact due to their engagement in “minor gears such as set
bottom longlines, traps, trolling lines and jigging” (MSDEC,
2013b).
By reiterating this clause on an annual basis as part of the
national program for the data collection framework (DCF) for
the EU, the government has, for the past decade, refrained from
doing any research on the exploitation rates of the recreational
fleet. While this may have been understandable back in 2005,
when the recreational fleet was less than half the size it is
today, this assessment appears less justifiable today and suggests
that the government may be deliberately maintaining such a
derogation as a regulatory loophole to retain the status quo
and avoid realistic management of the coastal socio-ecological
systems. Moreover, although catch data is collected for the fishing
gears used by the small-scale sector in line with the EU Data
Collection Framework (Department of Fisheries Aquaculture,
2013), this data is not analyzed or studied to inform policies
for the sustainability of the small-scale sector at the national
level.
The national policy focus falls almost entirely on fish
stocks connected to the large-scale fleet including (a) annual
studies for the demersal trawling fishery6 and the small-pelagic
purse-seining7conducted to assess the status of the specific
commercially-important stocks targeted by the trawlers and
purse seines respectively, and (b) EU-funded management
measures aimed at maintaining the sustainability of these
segments. For example, between 2013 and 2015, funding from
the European Fisheries Fund was earmarked by the national
government for a fishing effort adjustment plan of the trawling
fleet with the objective of “managing the fishing effort in
accordance with the aims of the Common Fisheries Policy, resulting
in a more sustainable fishing sector” (MSDEC, 2013c). Hence,
the premise of sustainability appears to be solely focused on the
industrial segment targeting coastal fisheries.
The Government’s legislative role in managing fisheries is
strictly aligned to EU policies, and at the time of writing,
there are no national plans to address overexploitation of fish
resources resulting from intensified competition between the
industrial, the small-scale and the escalating recreational catching
capacity. There are no specific plans to study the sustainability
of the small-scale segment and no political commitment seems
in place to govern the situation. The only action toward
managing this problem was through a setup of a government
sub-committee consisting of members from the fisheries co-
operatives and the federation for recreational fishers, as well as
other government institutions, with the aim of proposing a set of
6Mediterranean International Trawl Survey - MEDITS.
7Mediterranean Acoustic Survey on Small-Pelagics - MEDIAS.
technical measures tomanage the practices of recreational fishing
(MSDEC, 2013a).
However, the measures never materialized due to the
political pressure exerted by influential recreational fishers. These
individuals, close to the national election in 2013, used the
thousands of votes of the recreational fleet to “intimidate”
politicians and, in a series of post-election meetings defied and
challenged the Government’s approach on the basis that there are
no clear EU directives which oblige Member States to implement
recreational fishing management measures (pers. comm.). Since
then, no decisions were taken and there does not seem to be
particular political will to address this situation and to resolve
the overfishing crisis in the Maltese coastal waters. In fact, the
national authorities seem to have adopted a defensive attitude
to protect their fisheries governing strategy of Malta’s coastal
fisheries.
For example, in a newspaper letter to rectify the “anti-
thesis of the fish conservation policy” declarations which a small-
scale fisherman had highlighted through a newspaper article
(Caruana, 2015), the government reported back stating that
the fisheries management in Malta is done in line with EU
policy obligations, and that the problem of reduced catches
suffered is a result of overfishing across the Mediterranean—the
“DeadMed”(MaltaToday, 2016). In other words, the government
appears to be quoting supranational policies to defend its fishing
governance portfolio, and simultaneously confining a localized
problem of the Malta’s FMZ within the mainstream discourse of
overfishing and regional catch decline. By turning a blind eye to
these local problems and overtly “ignoring” the public pleas made
by the small-scale fishermen for a more realistic management
scheme, the unsustainable management of the marine commons
is likely to persist, creating a bleak future for small-scale and
recreational fisheries segments alike.
DISCUSSION
This paper, which is based on a case study in Malta explores
how the small-scale fishing sector in the Mediterranean can
become victimized by policy interstices in the absence of a holistic
management framework, and to elucidate the socio-political
realities that underpin the lag in inshore fisheries management,
and the consequential governance challenges that arise. We
explain how fisheries policies appear to be driven by a wider
political agenda of rationalization that are in place to promote
the growth of large corporate fishing sector at the expense
of traditional artisanal fishers. We establish that a substantial
number of recreational fishers are former artisanal fishermen
who have fallen out of the professional sector directly due to
policy changes, but who have been allowed to retain their gear
and rights associated with fishing in such a way that they present
a serious threat to the livelihoods of the professional artisanal
sector.
This research further adds up to the literature on the array
of challenges that small-scale fishing sectors are facing at EU
and international levels due to resource-use policies which are
embedded in the ecological and economic rhetoric of efficiency,
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and do not cater for the social importance of fishing communities
(Urquhart et al., 2011). In an era where sustainability has
become more about efficiency than about the people (Weaver,
2015), globally small-scale fishers are consistently enduring
consequences of policy misfits and it is becoming increasingly
difficult for them to persevere (Symes et al., 2015). Evidently,
this case study, which demonstrates how small-scale professional
fishing is increasingly becoming relegated into the recreational
segment, shows that the future of the small-scale fleet, as a lawful
economically active sector, is a rather bleak one.
In this article, we diagnose a series of policy and governance
gaps which are triggering overexploitation of coastal fisheries in
the Maltese waters and are cumulatively pushing out the small-
scale professional segment. We elucidate how this is happening
within a neoliberal political economy, which is tapping on
semi-legal opportunities and policy mixes to craft policies that
satisfy narrow political needs and economic interests, rather
than to effectively cater for the sustainable use of resources.
We demonstrate this by correlating the initial and major driver
behind overexploitation with the rationalization of the Maltese
fishing sector in 2004 which led to the enlargement of the
industrial segment, and to the creation of a recreational fishing
segment, which are both co-existing and competing with the
small-scale professional counterpart without any form of specific
management that regulates their sustainability.
Similar patterns of this rationalization-related creation of
recreational registers and consequent conflict with artisanal
fishers, as well as lack of holistic management of the contested
fisheries, have been recorded in other Mediterranean countries.
In Croatia 68% of the artisanal-professional fishers were pushed
into the recreational/subsistence sector on the basis they were
not full-time fishermen (Matic´-Skoko and Staglicˇic´, 2018) and
in Cyprus the present recreational fishers are ex-professional
fishers who were are allowed to retain their net-fishing in the
weekends as well as commercialize their catch (Hadjimichael,
2015).
On these lines, it is our contention that since the
Mediterranean regulation as a supranational policy only
regulates up to a specific level to endow the Member States with
the necessary adaptive flexibility to accord to their needs, such
flexibility can create space for policy gaps at the national level.
Such policy fissures typically occur in neoliberal dominated
landscapes where policy mix is used to promote neoliberal
agenda to strengthen capital, and simultaneously obscures the
real cause of the problem (Mansfield, 2004). In fact, since the
Mediterranean regulation obliges MS to implement management
plans for large-scale fisheries (mostly trawling and purse seining),
national management becomes deployed to myopically address
only specific resilience (Stoll et al., 2016) of large-scale fishing
interests. As a result of such policy interstice, the exploitative
patterns of small-scale professional and recreational segments
becomes disregarded, and ideological and spatial user-conflicts
between these segments are allowed to emerge due to multi-
scalar policy gaps which do not cater for a holistic management
of the contested open-access fisheries (Ratner et al., 2014).
We have shown how, in such situations, where policies
develop to be unclear and fail to define and regulate access to
the same pool of resources, socio-ecological systems develop
to be less governable (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2013; Coglan
and Pascoe, 2015) and overexploitation becomes inevitable
(Boonstra and Österblom, 2014). Such policy misfits between the
sustainable management of fishing socio-ecological systems and
the institutional framework is a sign of weak governance which
is prone to trigger, rather than prevent, the overexploitation
of open-access fisheries (Bodin and Österblom, 2013; Boonstra
and Österblom, 2014). In Malta’s case this governance challenge
has grown since the government’s political position has become
somewhat squeezed between the agenda of the large-scale sector
that are economically powerful, and the recreational segment
which, due to its increasing number, has become a strong force
not to be reckoned with.
We suggest that, given the governance challenges that national
and supranational policy mix create on the ground and the
concomitant regulatory problems that emanate from such gaps,
a governance shift is needed. This can include additional EU
mechanisms such as regulations that oblige Member States to
implement sustainability plans for both small-scale professional
fisheries and recreational ones, on the same lines as the large-
scale fisheries. Some EU Member States have implemented
measures to limit recreational fisheries through harvest controls,
such as daily bag limits, fishing licenses and spatial restrictions
(Pawson et al., 2008; Veiga et al., 2013). Other initiatives
could include the lead of fishers’ organizations in decentralized
approaches to manage their fisheries, a system that has proved
effective in the Northwest Mediterranean (Arceo et al., 2013).
This could be a way of protecting the traditional socio-ecological
systems and simultaneously resolving what is perceived as a
prevalent problem of fisheries crisis that is likely to remain a
global challenge for years to come (Coulthard et al., 2011; Froese
et al., 2018).
Moreover, it is recommended that an overhaul in the
neo-liberal ideology is necessary for the artisanal small-scale
communities to re-institute their image within a pro-efficient
climate, rather than just becoming (in)conveniently redirected
into the recreational sector. Plausible short-term mitigations
would include policy restrictions on the transferability of capacity
between the artisanal and large-scale industrial fleets in a way
that controls the neoliberal expansion of large-scale operations
to engender the prolongation of the small-scale fleets. On the
long-term, it is advisable to enhance collective action at the local
level and introduce co-management mechanisms to address the
situation of commons’ governance through a more decentralized
and effective system (Cinner et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
By providing a diagnosis of multi-scale policy failures of
open-access fisheries in a Southern European context, this
paper shows how a neoliberal rationalization of the Maltese
fishing fleet coupled with lack of holistic marine governance
has fuelled the battle for the commons, and simultaneously
catalyzed the demise of the traditional small-scale fisheries
systems. By using the narrative of economic efficiency and
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rationalization to facilitate the accumulation of resources into
fewer industrial hands, the national authorities has tapped
on supranational policy gaps in the Mediterranean regulation
to push nearly half of the small-scale segment into the
recreational fleet without carefullymanaging thismajor resource-
use shift. With intensified competition between the industrial
vessels, the small-scale professional fleet, and the burgeoning
recreational segment, resource overexploitation is happening
at a fast rate, and the national policy is not attuned to
manage this crisis. We show how intersecting supranational
and national open-access fisheries policy frameworks which
demonstrate a case of policy mix do not do justice to the
overall framework of sustainable fisheries exploitation, and
the gaps unavoidably perpetuate governance challenges that
become too complex to address. This paper gives an in-
depth illustration of the need to dig beyond the generic
narrative of economic efficiency and sustainability to decipher
the complexities and unpack the socio-political processes that
have not yet been fully discerned in the global analysis of open-
access fisheries.
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